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This Job Is ‘Getting Old:’ Measuring Changes in 
Job Opportunities Using Occupational Age Structure
* 
 
High- and low-wage occupations are expanding rapidly relative to middle-wage occupations 
in both the U.S. and the E.U. We study the reallocation of workers from middle-skill 
occupations towards the tails of the occupational skill distribution by analyzing changes in 
age structure within and across occupations. Because occupations typically expand by hiring 
young workers and contract by curtailing such hiring, we posit that growing occupations will 
get younger while shrinking occupations will ‘get old.’ After verifying this proposition, we apply 
this observation to local labor markets in the U.S. to test whether markets that were 
specialized in middle-skilled occupations in 1980 saw a differential movement of both older 
and younger workers into occupations at the tails of the skill distribution over the subsequent 
25 years. Consistent with aggregate trends, employment in initially middle-skill-intensive 
labor markets hollowed-out between 1980 and 2005. Employment losses among non-college 
workers in the middle of the occupational skill distribution were almost entirely countered by 
employment growth in lower-tail occupations. For college workers, employment losses at the 
middle were offset in roughly equal measures by gains in the upper- and lower-tails of the 
occupational skill distribution. But gains at the upper-tail were almost entirely limited to young 
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acknowledges funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation. One of the most remarkable developments in the U.S. labor market of the past two and a half
decades has been the rapid, simultaneous growth of employment in both the highest- and lowest-
skilled jobs. This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 1, which plots changes in the share of aggregate
hours worked at each percentile of the occupational skill distribution over the period 1980 through
2005. These skill percentiles are constructed by ranking occupations according to their mean hourly
wages in 1980 and grouping them into 100 bins, each comprising one percent of 1980 employment.1
The pronounced U-shape of Figure 1 underscores that employment growth over this 25 year period has
been disproportionate in the top and bottom of the occupational skill distribution. Occupations that
were in the lowest and highest deciles of the 1980 distribution grew in relative size by 10 to 25 percent
between 1980 and 2005, while occupations in the 2nd through 6th deciles contracted.2 This hollowing
out, or ‘polarization,’ of the occupational employment distribution is not unique to the United States.
Using harmonized European Union Labour Force Survey data, Maarten Goos, Alan Manning and
Anna Salomons (2008) ﬁnd that in 14 of 16 European countries for which data are available, high-
and low-paying occupations expanded relative to middle-wage occupations in the 1990s and 2000s.
A leading explanation for the hollowing out of the occupation distribution in industrial countries
is that non-neutral technical change, augmented by oﬀshoring, is eroding demand for middle-skilled
‘routine’ cognitive and manual activities, such as bookkeeping, clerical work and repetitive production
tasks (Daron Acemoglu, 1999; David H. Autor, Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane, 2003, ‘ALM’
hereafter; Autor, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, 2006; Alan Blinder, 2007; Maarten Goos
and Alan Manning, 2007; Autor and David Dorn, 2008).3 Because the core job tasks of these occupa-
tions follow precise, well-understood procedures, they are increasingly codiﬁed in computer software
and performed by machines or, alternatively, oﬀshored over computer networks to foreign worksites.
This displacement of routine job tasks raises relative demand for non-routine tasks in which workers
hold a comparative advantage over current technology, in particular ‘abstract’ tasks requiring problem-
solving, creativity, or complex interpersonal interactions (e.g., attorneys, scientists, managers), and
‘manual’ tasks requiring, variously, situational adaptability, visual and language recognition, and in—
person interactions (e.g., janitors and cleaners, home health aides, beauticians, construction laborers,
security personnel, and motor vehicle operators). Notably, these two categories of non-routine tasks lie
1All analyses in the paper use data from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census IPUMS and the 2005 American Community
Survey (ACS). Samples are limited to workers of age 16 through 64 years in the prior year, and all calculations are
weighted by labor supply, equal to the product of the Census sampling weight, weeks worked in the prior year, and
usual weekly hours. We group occupations into a balanced panel of 330 harmonized Census Occupation categories
encompassing all of U.S. employment over 1980 through 2005.
2The series in Figure 1 is smoothed with a locally weighted regression using a bandwidth of 0.8. Results are extremely
similar if we use the 2000 Census IPUMS in place of the 2005 ACS.
3See also Manning (2004), and Francesca Mazzolari and Giuseppe Ragusa (2008) for an alternative hypothesis at-
tributing the growth of low-skill employment to marketization of household production.
1at opposite ends of the skill distribution: abstract tasks are the core activity of professional specialty
and technical occupations while manual tasks are most intensive in personal service, transportation,
construction, and operative occupations. Thus, displacement of occupations intensive in routine tasks
and growth of occupations intensive in non-routine tasks may give rise to the U-shaped pattern of job
growth visible in Figure 1.
An important, unstudied question raised by this pattern of non-neutral occupational change is:
where do the routine workers go? In particular, as middle-skill routine occupations decline, which age
and skill groups move upward in the occupational distribution towards high-skill, non-routine jobs,
and conversely which groups gravitate downwards towards the lower tail of non-routine occupations?
Analyzing this process of occupational change oﬀers insights into the shifting opportunity set faced
by workers at diﬀerent age and education levels.
Our analysis relies on a simple and, to the best of our knowledge, novel approach for measuring
how changing job opportunities aﬀect worker re-allocation across occupations. The underlying idea
of this approach is that because workers develop occupation-speciﬁc human capital as they gain work
experience, skill speciﬁcity makes the costs of occupational mobility higher for older than younger
workers (cf. Derek Neal, 1999). When an occupation declines, therefore, older workers will face an
incentive not to exit the occupation while younger workers will face an incentive not to enter. Moreover,
ﬁrms may react to changing demands for occupations by hiring young workers into growing occupations
and curtailing such hiring into contracting jobs. These suppositions imply that occupations will ‘get
old’ as their employment declines–that is, the mean age of an occupation’s workforce will rise.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We ﬁrst oﬀer a simple ‘proof of concept’ to demonstrate the
tight empirical link between declines in an occupation’s employment and increases in the mean age of
its workforce. The balance of the paper then applies this tool to the study of local labor markets to
assess how shifts in occupational structure have aﬀected the job composition of young and old workers
at diﬀerent education levels between 1980 and 2005. In particular, we exploit pre-existing diﬀerences
in occupational specialization across local labor markets to identify areas subject to diﬀering degrees
of ‘hollowing out’ of employment. We use this variation to measure how, in response to contracting
routine employment, workers of diﬀering ages and education levels are reallocated towards the tails of
the occupation distribution.
21 Are Middle-Skill Jobs Getting Old?
We ﬁrst document the robust relationship between changes in occupational size and shifts in the age
distribution of the occupation’s workforce. Table 1 reports simple bivariate regressions of the form:
∆ =  + 1∆ +  (1)
where  is the mean age of workers in occupation  or the share of workers in that occupation who
fall into a given age bracket,  is the share of an occupation in total employment in a given year, and
the ∆ operator denotes the change in a variable over the time interval 1980 to 2005.
The average age of the working population rose by 3.3 years during 1980 through 2005, reﬂecting
the aging of the baby boom cohorts. Occupations that contracted over this period aged substantially
faster than average. Column (1) of the ﬁrst panel shows that occupations that contracted by 1
percentage point as a share of aggregate employment between 1980 and 2005 gained in age by an
additional 0.78 years relative to the mean. Columns (2) through (4) show that, as hypothesized, age
increases in contracting occupations are driven by a falling employment share of young workers and
rising employment shares of prime age and older workers.
Figure 2 plots smoothed changes in the mean age of workers by occupational skill percentile between
1980 and 2005. This ﬁgure shows a distinct inverted U-shape that is a near mirror-image of changes in
occupational employment shares depicted in Figure 1. Occupations in the bottom and top two deciles
of the skill distribution aged by roughly 2 years between 1980 and 2005, which is substantially below
the overall average of 3.3 years. By contrast, occupations in the second through sixth skill deciles aged
disproportionately rapidly, gaining approximately 4 years on average. Thus, over the last twenty-ﬁve
years, middle-skill jobs have gotten old.
2 Are Routine Task-Intensive Jobs Getting Old?
If routine tasks are indeed being supplanted by technology and oﬀshoring, then employment declines
should be concentrated in occupations that are specialized in such tasks. The year 1980 is a particularly
apt starting point for gauging the eﬀects of workplace computerization. National Income and Product
Accounts data show that the share of computer hardware and software in all U.S. private nonresidential
capital investment hovered at approximately 4 percent from 1970 to 1978, and then rose steeply at
approximately three-quarters of a percentage point per year through the year 2000.4 Thus, occupations
concentrated in routine tasks would be predicted by our hypothesis to experience sharp contractions
4Authors’ calculations using NIPA data (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002).
3from 1980 going forward.
To assess this hypothesis using occupational age structure as above, we draw on occupation level
data assembled by ALM, who merge job data on task requirements–manual, routine and abstract–
from the fourth edition of the US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US
Department of Labor, 1977) to their corresponding Census occupation classiﬁcations. For each occu-
pation , we form an index of routine task-intensity, :
 =l n
³
ˆ 1980 ˆ 1980
´
 (2)
where ˆ  and ˆ  are, respectively, the intensity of routine and manual task input in each occupation in
1980, measured on a 0 to 10 scale. This measure is rising in the relative importance of routine tasks
within an occupation and falling in the relative importance of manual tasks. Since  does not have
a cardinal scale, we standardize it with a mean of zero and an employment weighted, cross-occupation
standard deviation of unity in 1980.
This simple measure appears to capture well the job categories that motivate our conceptual
framework. Among the 10 most routine task-intensive occupations in our sample of 330, 6 are clerical
and accounting occupations and several others represent repetitive physical motion activities. Among
the 10 least routine task intensive occupations, 4 are in-person service occupations, while the remainder
involve driving motor vehicles.5
To test the link between routine task-intensity and changes in age structure, we estimate a variant
of equation (1) in which the  measure is included as a predictor of changes in occupational age
structure. The second and third panels of Table 1 show that this variable is highly signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations. Occupations that in 1980 were one standard deviation above the mean of routine-
intensity, gain 0.6 years of age relative to the mean over the next twenty-ﬁve years. This age gain
is driven by declining relative employment of young workers in routine task-intensive occupations,
and by rising relative employment of older workers, particularly those ages 55 to 64. The third panel
of Table 1 shows that the predictive relationship between routine-intensity and occupation aging is
quite robust to controlling for contemporaneous changes in occupations’ employment shares–though
of course the employment shares of routine task-intensive occupations fall signiﬁcantly in this period.
Thus, like middle-skill occupations, routine task-intensive occupations are getting old. This ﬁnding
is not entirely surprising, of course; middle-skill occupations are also disproportionately routine task-
intensive.
5Additional details on the Routine Task Intensity measure are found in Autor and Dorn (2008), who develop this
measure using the ALM data.
43 Where do the Routine Workers Go?
We now exploit the robust predictive relationship between occupational decline and aging to study
how the decline of routine occupations aﬀects the opportunity set of workers at diﬀerent age and
skill levels. Speciﬁcally, we ask which non-routine jobs absorb young and older workers as routine
task-intensive occupations are displaced.
For this analysis, we shift the unit of observation from changes in age structure within occupations
to changes in the age composition of employment within local labor markets, following an approach
developed by Christopher L. Smith (2008). Based on the results above, we anticipate that local labor
markets that were specialized in routine task-intensive occupations at the start of the sample period
should have experienced a diﬀerential contraction of middle-skill jobs over the subsequent 25 years.
We use this cross-market variation in (expected) occupational declines to analyze the eﬀect of the
thinning of the ranks of middle-skill occupations on the occupational distribution of young and old
workers.
As a time-consistent measure of local labor markets, we implement the concept of Commuting
Zones (‘CZs’), developed by Charles M. Tolbert and Molly Sizer (1996), who used conﬁdential com-
muting data from the 1990 Census to identify clusters of counties–i.e., Commuting Zones–that
exhibit strong commuting ties within clusters but weak commuting across clusters. Our analysis uses
722 CZs that cover the entire mainland of the US, including both metropolitan and rural areas.6
To measure cross-market variation in employment in routine task-intensive occupations, we ap-
ply a simple binary approach to distinguish ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ occupations. We classify as
routine occupations those that fall in the top-third of the employment-weighted distribution of the
 measure in 1980. Using this classiﬁcation, we then assign to each commuting zone  ar o u t i n e
employment share measure () equal to the fraction of CZ employment at the start of a decade
that falls in routine task-intensive occupations. The mean of this measure in 1980 is, by construction,
equal to 033. The population weighted 80/20 percentile diﬀerence in routine employment share is 10
percentage points (speciﬁcally, 20 =0 27 and 80 =0 37).
Putting these pieces together, we estimate in Table 2 a set of OLS stacked ﬁrst-diﬀerence models
for CZ level changes in occupational employment by age and education:
∆ = α + 2 + X0
β3 +  (3)
6Commuting zones have two advantages over other geographic units typically used for analysis of local labor markets:
they are based primarily on economic geography rather than incidental factors such as minimum population or state
boundaries; and they cover the entire U.S. In addition, it is possible to use Census Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs) to
consistently match Census geography to CZs for the full period of our analysis (see Autor and Dorn, 2008 for details).
5where  is an outcome measure for age-education group  in commuting zone  over the 5 or 10 year
time interval ,  is the routine employment share in the CZ at the start of the time interval,
α is a vector of time dummies, and X is a vector of start-of-period control variables, including state
dummies and measures of the initial age, education, and employment structure of the commuting
zone.
Estimates of equation (3) produce a number of striking results. Panel A of Table 2 shows that,
as predicted, CZ’s that were initially specialized in routine task-intensive occupations saw substantial
declines in the share of workers employed in these occupations between 1980 and 2005. These declines
are evident at all age levels, but they are uniformly larger for younger than older workers. Interestingly,
the decline in routine employment is greater for non-college workers (high school or lower education)
than for college workers (at least one year of college). A potential explanation for this pattern is that
less educated workers in routine task-intensive occupations perform a disproportionate share of the
routine tasks, and thus are diﬀerentially subject to displacement.
Which occupations absorb workers from these diﬀerent age brackets as routine task-intensive jobs
in a Commuting Zone contract? To form a simple accounting, we use occupational wage data from 1980
to evenly divide the two-thirds of employment classiﬁed as non-routine into two occupation clusters
containing equal shares of 1980 employment, one cluster containing low-wage occupations and the
other high-wage occupations. Notably, these occupational clusters roughly correspond to the two non-
routine task categories deﬁned above (i.e., abstract and manual). The high-skill non-routine cluster
is largely composed of professional specialty and technical occupations, with mean log hourly wages
that are 40 percent above the routine occupation mean. The low-skill non-routine group is largely
composed of low-education service, labor, and operative occupations, with mean log hourly wages 20
percent below the routine occupation mean.
Panels B and C of Table 2 show that relative declines in routine occupation employment within
CZs are primarily oﬀs e tb yr e l a t i v ee m p l o y m e n tg a i n si nlow-skill non-routine occupations–jobs that
are signiﬁcantly less skill-intensive and lower-paying than the routine occupations that are displaced.
Among the three age brackets we consider, only yo u n gw o r k e r sa g e s1 6t o2 9g a i ni ne m p l o y m e n ti n
high-skill non-routine occupations. Both the prime age and older age groups gain employment in low-
skill non-routine occupations. Moreover, even among the young, employment gains in high-skill non-
routine occupations are less than half as large as gains in low-skill non-routine occupations. Clearly, the
hollowing out of employment in initially routine task-intensive local labor markets primarily generates
a movement of employment into low-skill, non-routine jobs.
6When we drill down on these occupational shifts by education group, however, it is immediately
apparent that declines in routine employment have decidedly non-neutral impacts across education
groups and across age groups within an education level. The second row of Table 2 shows that college
workers in initially routine task-intensive labor markets gain employment in both high- and low-skill
non-routine jobs. But the gains in high-skill non-routine employment are concentrated among the
young and almost entirely absent among the old. Thus, the bulk of the diﬀerential decline in routine
employment among young college workers in these labor markets is oﬀset by gains in high-skill non-
routine employment. Among prime-age and older workers, however, oﬀsetting employment gains are
found mostly in low-skill non-routine jobs. Thus, it appears that the opportunity for high-education
workers to reallocate upward depends greatly on age.
The ﬁnal row of Table 2 portrays an even less encouraging picture for non-college workers. For
this skill group, the entire diﬀerential decline in routine employment in routine task-intensive CZ’s is
absorbed by increased low-skill, non-routine employment. Moreover, while young non-college workers
roughly hold their ground in high-skill, non-routine occupations, prime age and older non-college
workers diﬀerentially lose employment in high-skill, non- r o u t i n ej o b sa n dg a i ni ne m p l o y m e n ti nl o w -
skill, non-routine jobs.
In summary, the occupational structure of college workers in routine task-intensive labor markets
is hollowing out, with movement of workers towards both tails. The occupational structure of non-
college workers, however, is shifting uniformly leftward towards lower-paying, non-routine jobs. This
leftward shift is most pronounced for older age groups.
These patterns are quite robust. Although the models in Table 2 include only time dummies
and implicitly, Commuting Zone eﬀects (recall that these are ﬁrst-diﬀerence models), the qualitative
pattern of results is little changed when the model is augmented with state ﬁxed eﬀects and detailed
controls for the initial human capital, demographic, and industrial structure of commuting zones.7
4C o n c l u s i o n
Aggregate employment has shifted over the last twenty-ﬁve years against middle-skill, routine task-
intensive work and towards the tails of the occupational skill distribution. Occupations at both tails
are appropriately labeled as non-routine, but they diﬀer greatly in skill and pay. The right-hand tail
of the distribution encompasses high-skill, non-routine occupations that typically require capabilities
in problem-solving, abstract reasoning, and decision-making. The left-hand tail encompasses low-skill
7A supplementary table is available from the authors.
7non-routine occupations that demand basic human adaptability but little in the way of formal training.
The contraction of routine occupations is therefore likely to have diﬀerent impacts on workers across
age and skill groups, depending on their ability to move upward towards high-skill, non-routine jobs
or, conversely, downwards towards low-skill, non-routine jobs.
By comparing local labor markets that, due to initial diﬀerences in concentration in routine task-
intensive activities in 1980, are subject to diﬀering degrees of occupational change over the subsequent
twenty-ﬁve years, we ﬁnd that contractions of routine employment within local markets dispropor-
tionately raise the share of workers employed in low-skill, non-routine jobs. In fact, only the youngest
category of workers exhibits both downward and upward occupational reallocation; for other age
groups, movement is entirely downward. Highly-educated workers are clearly better prepared to adapt
to changing occupational opportunities, and thus it is to be expected that college-educated workers
are reallocating upwards as well as downwards. But the degree of upward reallocation is strongly
negatively correlated with age: while young college workers are gaining employment in high-skill,
non-routine occupations, older college workers are increasingly found in low-skill, non-routine work.
These secular shifts of age and education groups across occupational categories provide only a
preliminary sense of what may potentially be learned from changing occupational age structures. We
focus here on changes in occupational structure within age groups, but do not address how changes
in aggregate job composition shape the progression of birth cohorts across occupations as they age.
Our ongoing work suggests that the simple tools used above hold some promise for exploring these
questions.
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Figure 1. Smoothed Changes in Employment Share 
by Occupational Skill Percentile, 1980 - 2005
Figure 2. Smoothed Changes in Mean Worker Age 
















0 20 40 60 80 100

































0 20 40 60 80 100


















eIndependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.78 ** 0.027 ** -0.020 ** -0.007 ~
(0.18) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
0.55 ** -0.015 ** 0.004 0.011 **
(0.11) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
0.50 ** -0.013 ** 0.003 0.010 **
(0.10) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
-0.66 ** 0.023 ** -0.019 ** -0.004
(0.18) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Mean 3.25 -0.128 0.120 0.008
SD (1.99) (0.065) (0.057) (0.036)
Table 1. Predicting Changes in the Age Structure of Occupations 




A. OLS model 1
∆ Occ's Share of 
Total Emp (pct pts)
∆ Share of Workers 
in Age Bracket







N=330 harmonized occupations. Each column of panels A, B, and C 
corresponds to a separate OLS regression of the outcome variable at 
the top of the column on tabulated control variables and a constant. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are weighted by 
occupational shares in total hours worked in 1980.  ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 
0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
D. Descriptive statistics
Occ's Routine Task 
Intensity in 1980
C. OLS model 3
∆ Occ's Share of 
Total Emp (pct pts)
Occ's Routine Task 
Intensity in 1980All workers -0.31 ** -0.21 ** -0.25 **
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
College workers -0.18 ** -0.11 ** -0.12 **
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Non-college workers -0.46 ** -0.28 ** -0.23 **
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
All workers 0.10 ** -0.01 -0.06 *
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
College workers 0.15 ** 0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Non-college workers 0.04 -0.09 ** -0.19 **
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
All workers 0.22 ** 0.22 ** 0.31 **
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
College workers 0.02 0.08 ** 0.15 **
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Non-college workers 0.42 ** 0.37 ** 0.42 **
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
N=2166 (3 time periods x 722 commuting zones). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Each cell corresponds 
to a separate stacked first difference model. Models are weighted 
by start of period commuting zone share of national population and 
contain a constant and two time dummies. College workers are 
those with at least some college education. Occupations are 
classified as routine task-intensive if they fall in the top third of the 
employment-weighted distribution of the routine-intensity measure 
in 1980. Nonroutine occupations are classified as high-skill if they 
fall in the top half of the employment-weighted distribution of mean 
wages in non-routine occupations in 1980, and are classified as low-
skill otherwise. ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
Coefficient on [Share 
of Routine Occs-1] for 
Skill Group Below
C. Low-Skill Non-Routine Occs
B. High-Skill Non-Routine Occs
A. Routine-Intensive Occs
Table 2. Predicting Changes in the Allocation of Age Groups across 
Occupations using Initial Commuzing Zone Employment Shares in 
Routine-Intensive Occupations, 1980-2005. 
∆ Occupation's Share of Age Bracket
Young 
16-29
Prime
30-54
Older 
55-64